Countries in mainland Southeast Asia have stark differences in renewable energy strategies, balancing them with ample but controversial hydropower and entrenched interests. While solar power has become accessible and cost effective, many of these nations have struggled to make wind power an essential part of renewable energy strategies, despite having locations with high potential. Meanwhile, others have become regional wind power leaders, such as Vietnam. In this explainer, we explore how various mainland Southeast Asian countries are engaging with wind power development.
Top image: Wind turbines in Phan Rang, a coastal city in southern Vietnam. Photo by Thoại Phạm via Alamy.
Thailand
While Thailand has aggressively pursued solar and hydro, it made a slow start on wind power, despite having high-wind areas in the north and northeast. The first project, in Phuket, began in 1983, but projects exceeding one megawatt (MW) did not begin until 2008. The country only reached around 400MW by 2019. As of 2023, wind makes up only around 3% (around 1.5 gigawatts) of the kingdom’s installed capacity.
There is potential for 13-17 gigawatts (GW) of onshore wind energy across the country. And while most of Thailand’s wind power comes from ground-mounted projects, there is potential for another 18–36GW per year offshore in the Andaman Sea.
Solar has made huge strides in Thailand in recent years, with a current estimated capacity of 3GW and plans to reach 39GW by 2040. Despite this, Thailand is relying on an energy future ruled by liquefied natural gas (LNG), including the building of new infrastructure in Rayong and the Gulf of Thailand.
The current draft of Thailand’s 2025–2037 Power Development Plan (PDP) aims to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 and net-zero emissions by 2065. The plan includes installing an additional 7GW of wind power capacity.
While the draft (due to be passed by the end of 2025) is aggressively pursuing renewable energy in solar, wind and biomass, its critics claim the government’s energy demand projections are too high: it predicts that the current supply must more than double by 2037. Other criticisms are that the current plan is over-reliant on more traditional energy projects, such as LNG, and that it is holding back the development of renewables.
Traditionally, Thailand’s supply chain for building wind power plants has been provided by foreign interests. As the kingdom ramps up its renewables efforts for net-zero targets, however, a concerted push has been made to produce and develop wind power components domestically.
Thailand’s leading wind energy developer, Wind Energy Holding, currently operates eight wind power plants. In June, the company announced it was preparing 2GW of projects in line with the current PDP. Yeong Guan Energy Technology, a Chinese company, plans to begin wind power component production trials in Thailand in 2025.
Thai companies are also investing in wind power abroad. Late last year, BCPG Public Company Limited, a renewable-energy subsidiary of the partially state-owned conglomerate Bangchak Corporation, announced it was acquiring a firm that operates two wind power plants in Vietnam.
Thailand also funds controversial hydropower dams on the Mekong mainstream and its tributaries, in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. These projects have been linked to declining fisheries and unseasonable flooding and droughts, affecting biodiversity and riverine livelihoods. As such, more emphasis is being placed by environmental groups on the use of non-hydro renewables, such as wind and solar.
At present, the push for renewable energy is reviving Thailand’s wind power prospects, as is the current Feed-in-Tariff system, in which producers are offered fixed prices to provide power to the grid. But the PDP 2025-2037 will be essential in deciding how diversified the kingdom’s renewable future will be.
Laos
The energy plan of Laos has centered around being the “Battery of Asia,” using the nation’s natural resources to create hydropower that it sells to its Southeast Asian neighbors and China.
However, the use of the Mekong’s resources has been a heavy source of contention in the Greater Mekong region, so Laos has taken steps to include more solar and wind projects.
The most widely publicized of its upcoming wind projects is the Power China-produced Thai collaboration that was completed this year, the Monsoon Wind Power project (MWP). It is the first large-scale ground-mounted wind farm in landlocked Laos and has been touted as the largest in Southeast Asia. Continuing the Battery of Asia model with wind power, the 250MW onshore Trường Sơn wind project is expected to supply energy to neighboring Vietnam after its planned completion date later in 2025.
The April 2023 groundbreaking ceremony for the Monsoon Wind Power project in Vientiane, Laos. Photo by Kaikeo Saiyasane via Xinhua/Alamy.
Both Thailand and China have played crucial roles in the energy infrastructure of Laos, in terms of development and power purchase agreements. The MWP project was bankrolled by the Thai company Impact Electrons Siam, and is being rolled out as a prototype that could potentially be used in Laos as a viable form of export energy.
Around 80% of the electricity produced by Laos is exported to other countries. The MWP project features a 500 kilovolt transmission line to neighboring Vietnam, 22 kilometers of which will be in Laos and 43 kilometers in Vietnam, which has signed a 25-year power purchase agreement for the project.
Straddling the provinces of Sekong and Attapeu, the MWP project contains 133 wind turbines. According to a quarterly environmental and social monitoring report, it has affected 934 households across 26 villages, with agricultural land most affected. The report identified 210 hectares of agricultural land as temporarily or permanently changed, along with impacts on 112 hectares of forest. Projections from the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank also noted local anecdotal evidence of biodiversity loss in the project development area.
Though the project was only completed in April, Laos is already moving toward a wind farm that is twice as big: the AMI Savannakhet, a 1,200MW wind farm in Savannakhet province, occupying nearly 2,700 hectares.
In 2023, it was estimated that non-hydro renewables made up less than 0.5% of energy generation in Laos. But analysis of its 2020-2030 National Power Development Plan indicates that — while still relying heavily on hydropower — non-hydro renewables will eventually make up 5%.
Cambodia
Cambodia has suffered from large-scale power shortages and blackouts. These stem from over-consumption issues and, less recently, drought-based hydropower lapses. According to a 2023 World Bank survey, as many as 43% of firms experienced electricity outages in Cambodia, as the country contends with meeting its short-term power needs.
The kingdom does not yet have any major wind farms, but in May 2025, authorities approved six wind power projects in Mondulkiri Province that are expected to generate 900MW. Each developer has a 150MW allocation but there are few public details about construction timelines.
HK Oasis Power’s 150MW wind power station is currently the first of the six planned and is expected to begin operating in 2026. These wind projects should become a source of power during the country’s dry season, which usually runs from November to April.
Another upcoming Mondulkiri wind farm is the 100MW Singaporean Blue Circle project. It will be built in conjunction with Cambodia’s Royal Group, which is also responsible for the controversial, 400MW Lower Sesan 2 hydropower plant.
These projects are a boon for Cambodia’s non-hydro renewable goals but the wind farms raise questions about impacts for wildlife habitats and local ways of life. Mondulkiri’s Indigenous Bunong residents have claimed some of the construction works could impact their lives and livelihoods. For example, one of the companies with project approval, SchneiTec Co, has been constructing a 299-kilometer power transmission line through Cambodia’s Prey Lang wildlife sanctuary.
Previous wind power projects in Cambodia hit permanent snags, such as a Blue Circle project in Kampot, which was set to begin construction on an 80MW wind farm in 2021. It was cancelled after failing to agree a per-kilowatt-hour tariff rate with the state-run energy supplier, Electricite du Cambodge.
Authorities have stated that wind power will be integrated into the national grid by 2026. But despite these coming projects, Cambodia’s Power Development Plan up to 2040 will lead to only a marginal increase in wind power when compared to other sources, like solar. This is because Cambodia’s wind power potential is comparatively low for mainland Southeast Asia.
Despite issuing a 10-year moratorium on dam building on the Mekong mainstream in 2020, a majority of the renewable energy in Cambodia still comes from hydropower. The rest — just 10.5% — came from solar sources as of 2022, according to the International Energy Agency.
Vietnam
Wind power is the largest source of non-hydro renewable energy in Vietnam, 80% of which was provided by 84 wind farms as of 2023. The country’s status as a regional leader in wind power has been largely attributed to a beneficial feed-in tariff system: the government pays guaranteed, above-average prices for renewable energy. The tariff, along with Vietnam’s government policy and strong potential for both on- and offshore wind energy generation, have attracted investors.
With an installed capacity of nearly 5GW as of 2024, Vietnam has made key changes to its Power Development Plan (PDP8), with a revised draft published in April outlining the country’s energy outlook to 2035. The original PDP8 of May 2023 had an ambitious outlook for onshore wind, including a goal of installing more than 21GW of onshore wind capacity by 2030. This has since been raised to 38GW. This is despite the revised PDP8 also outlining a large increase in expected solar energy, increasing the previous target by nearly six times to over 73GW.
But while Vietnam was an early and enthusiastic adopter of onshore wind power in mainland Southeast Asia, the country has been slow to adopt offshore wind. The original PDP8 planned for 6GW of offshore wind by 2030; this has been revised to 6-17GW by 2035.
Vietnam has signed several agreements for offshore wind projects, including a joint development between the state-owned PetroVietnam and Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners, a Danish renewable energy developer. The US$10.5 billion investment will supply 3.5GW of wind power. Another is the 1.4GW Phú Cường Sóc Trăng offshore wind farm, developed by the Irish company Mainstream Renewable Power.
In July, authorities said construction on the first project is “likely” to begin by the end of this year.
The Bạc Liêu offshore wind farm on the south coast of Vietnam. Photo by Quang Nguyen Vinh via Alamy.
Recent studies show Vietnam has the potential to generate just over one terawatt of wind energy in its exclusive economic zone, nearly doubling previous World Bank estimates.
Nonetheless, Vietnam has struggled to generate investments for its renewable projects due to fears that its favorable energy tariffs will end. These policies have created a boom in Vietnam’s renewables sector but they have also created losses for the state-owned Vietnam Electricity (EVN), leading authorities to attempt to reduce them.
The revised PDP8 includes far-off goals for offshore wind projects. This is because, at current estimates, development elements such as permit issuance and construction planning is taking up to a decade.
As the country rapidly multiplies its wind power projects, concerns have been raised regarding the local socioeconomic costs of this. Vietnam’s many nearshore wind farms have faced criticism from fishers, whose incomes have been impacted by government-imposed fishing bans for wind farm perimeter zones.
Both onshore and offshore wind farms also create risks to biodiversity. They could present problems for migratory birds, including endangered species from Siberia that migrate to Vietnam for winter, such as the Nordmann’s greenshank and spoon-billed sandpiper.
Myanmar
Myanmar, still embroiled in civil conflict at the time of writing, has had a number of wind power projects fall through. These include the high-profile, Chinese-built Chaung Tha project, which fell apart long before Myanmar’s military junta took control via the 2021 coup.
The current administration is working with Russia to cultivate wind power. The Russian state-owned firm Rosatom, which also has nuclear energy ambitions in Myanmar, began working with a Myanmar developer on plans to build a 200MW wind farm near Mount Popa in 2023.
Despite the civil war in Myanmar and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the collaboration has seen movement in the past two years. Myanmar claims it is fast-tracking Mount Popa. The energy ministry has also signed a memorandum of understanding for eight wind-power projects across the country. Rosatom is behind three of them.
In 2023, Myanmar agreed to work with China on three wind power projects in Ann, Gwa and Thandwe, all in Rakhine state, for projects ranging from 100-150MW. However, reports in 2024 said the Ann and Thandwe projects had been taken over by the Rakhine people’s Arakan army.
Beyond its domestic wind power ambitions, Myanmar plays a key role in the development of regional wind power. It is a site for the illicit mining of heavy rare earth elements (HREEs). These are used to produce powerful permanent magnets in wind turbines that increase power generation and improve heat resistance, lowering the maintenance demands of larger — especially offshore — turbines.
A 2024 Global Witness report on HREEs states that firms involved in the creation of these magnets are reliant on Myanmar’s supply. Chinese interests are responsible for 85% of all rare earth processing, and China is the world’s number one consumer of HREEs.
The unregulated and illicit mining of HREEs in Myanmar has led to high environmental and human costs. This is expected to continue. In addition to deadly mining incidents, chemicals used in the mining process such as oxalic acid have reportedly caused skin and respiratory damage, as well as deaths related to kidney failure.
The Global Witness report also highlights the use of in-situ leaching, a process by which ammonium sulfate is injected into pipes in the ground to circulate and extract rare earths. It says the toxins from these processes are flowing into streams where local people fish and collect drinking water. Nearby residents claim this chemical exposure is leading to deaths, the devastation of fish and other animal populations, and the report also notes that surrounding lands are becoming non-arable.
China backs the military junta. Its position as both participant and mediator in Myanmar’s conflict drastically affects global access to rare earth material. Almost half of the world’s accessible rare earth materials are mined in Kachin, Myanmar’s northernmost state. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) took control of much of these resources in October 2024. The following May, China demanded the KIA stabilize the rare earth supply chain and threatened to stop buying HREEs from Myanmar.
This article was originally produced by Dialogue Earth and has been republished with permission. Read the original version here.
